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Abstract 
 
Is innovation important for development? And if so, how?   One popular perception of 
innovation, that one meets in media every day, is that has to do with developing brand new, 
advanced solutions for sophisticated, well-off customers, through exploitation of the most recent 
advances in knowledge. Such innovation is normally seen as carried out by highly educated 
labour in R&D intensive companies, being large or small, with strong ties to leading centers of 
excellence in the scientific world. Hence innovation in this sense is a typical “first world” 
activity.  There is, however, another way to look at innovation that goes significantly beyond the 
high-tech picture just described. In this broader perspective, innovation – the attempt to try out 
new or improved products, processes or ways to do things – is an aspect of most if not all 
economic activities. It includes not only technologically new products and processes but also 
improvements in areas such as logistics, distribution and marketing.  The term may also be used 
for changes that are new to the local context, even if the contribution to the global knowledge 
frontier is negligible. In this broader sense, it is argued, innovation may be as relevant in the 
developing part of the world as elsewhere. The paper surveys the existing literature on the 
subject with a strong emphasis on recent evidence on the macro and – in particular - micro level.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Is innovation important for development? And if so, how? The answers to these questions 
depend, we will argue, on what is meant by the term innovation. One popular perception of 
innovation, that one meets in media every day, is that has to do with developing brand new, 
advanced solutions for sophisticated, well-off customers, through exploitation of the most recent 
advances in knowledge. Such innovation is normally seen as carried out by highly educated 
labour in R&D intensive companies, being large or small, with strong ties to leading centers of 
excellence in the scientific world. Hence innovation in this sense is a typical “first world” 
activity.  
There is, however, another way to look at innovation that goes significantly beyond the 
high-tech picture just described. In this broader perspective, innovation – the attempt to try out 
new or improved products, processes or ways to do things – is an aspect of most if not all 
economic activities (Kline and Rosenberg 1986, Bell and Pavitt 1993). It includes not only 
technologically new products and processes but also improvements in areas such as logistics, 
distribution and marketing. Even in so-called low-tech industries, there may be a lot of 
innovation going on, and the economic effects may be very large (von Tunzelmann and Acha 
2004). Moreover, the term innovation may also be used for changes that are new to the local 
context, even if the contribution to the global knowledge frontier is negligible. In this broader 
sense, innovation may be as relevant in the developing part of the world as elsewhere. Although 
many of the outcomes are less glamorous than celebrated breakthroughs in the high-tech world, 
there is no reason to believe that their cumulative social and economic impact is smaller 
(Fagerberg, et al. 2004). In this broader perspective, innovation becomes as important for 
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developing countries as for the rich part of the world, an argument which is also strongly 
supported by evidence from the surveys of innovation activities in firms referred to below. 
It is fair to say that the question of how technology and innovation influence economic 
development is a controversial issue, and has been so for a long time (Fagerberg and Godinho 
2004). In section 2 of this chapter we trace the discussions back to Torstein Veblen’s writings 
about Germany’s industrialization nearly a century ago. Here Veblen pointed to some of the 
issues, such as the nature of technology, the conditions for technological catch up etc., that have 
been central to the discussion to the present day. In fact, he was very optimistic about the 
possibilities for technological and economic catch-up by poorer economies. This optimistic 
mood came to be shared by neoclassical economists when they, nearly half a century later, 
turned their attention to the same issues. In this conception of reality, technology was assumed to 
be a so-called “public good”, freely available for everyone everywhere. Hence, a common 
interpretation of neoclassical growth theory (Solow 1956) has been that catch up and 
convergence in the global economy will occur automatically (and quickly) as long as market 
forces are allowed to “do their job”.  
However, writers from several other strands, such as economic historians, with Alexander 
Gerschenkron (1962) as the prime example, or economists inspired by the revival of interest in 
Joseph Schumpeter’s works that took place from the 1960s onwards, have been much less 
optimistic in this regard. According to these writers, there is nothing automatic about 
technological catch up, it requires considerable effort and organizational and institutional change 
to succeed (Ames and Rosenberg1963). A central theme in the literature on the subject concerns 
the various “capabilities” that firms, industries and countries need to generate in order to escape 
the low development trap. Following this perspective, countries that do not succeed in 
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developing appropriate technological capabilities and other complementary conditions should be 
expected to continue to lag behind. Concepts such as “social capability” (Ohkawa and Rosovsky 
1974, Abramovitz 1986), “technological capability” (Kim 1980, 1997), “absorptive capacity” 
(Cohen and Levintal 1990) and “innovation system” (Lundvall 1992, Nelson 1993, Edquist 
1997) have been suggested and a burgeoning empirical literature has emerged focusing on these 
aspects of development (see Fagerberg and Godinho 2004, Archibugi and Coco 2005 for 
overviews). In section 2 of this chapter we explore the different suggestions and consider the 
relevance for development. 
Having dealt with what the literature on catch-up and economic growth has to say, we 
move in section 3 closer to the empirical evidence on the subject matter. Until relatively recently 
there has not been much data available that could be exploited to explore the relationship 
between innovation and diffusion of technology on the one hand, and economic development on 
the other. But during the last few decades, national governments and international organizations 
started to devote more efforts to collect statistics on factors relevant for innovation and diffusion, 
and various attempts have been made to capitalize on these investments to produce indicators of 
the technological capabilities (or competiveness) of countries, including the developing ones.  
Although many of the data sources used to illustrate country-level technological 
capabilities reflect activities at the firm-level, direct information on innovation activities of firms 
has been scarce. However, from the early 1990s, some countries, mainly in Europe, started to 
survey innovation activities in firms, and more recently such surveys have also been conducted 
in the developing part of the world. These surveys are based on a broad notion of innovation, 
including not only those that are “new to the world,” and therefore have the potential to reveal 
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important insights about innovation activities in such economies. We explore this ongoing work 
in section 4 of this chapter.  
Finally, in section 5 we turn to another controversial issue, namely the extent to which 
technological activities in developing countries depend mainly on “spillovers” from the outer 
world. Much economic theorizing and applied work (see, e.g., Grossman and Helpman 1991, 
Coe and Helpman 1995) suggest that for all but the largest countries of the world, foreign 
sources dominate and much policy advice to developing countries has been based on this 
presumption. Critics contend that this is not only a question of access to technology but also 
about the ability to absorb it in a way conducive to development. We examine the evidence that 
has been brought to the table on this issue. Section 6 sums up our current knowledge about 
innovation and development.  
 
2. Innovation, catching-up and falling behind - taking stock of the 
literature 
 
This section provides an introduction to the main strands of literature of relevance for our topic. 
The so-called “old” neoclassical growth theory of the 1950s provides a useful starting point. As 
mentioned above this theory was based on the idea of technology as a public good, freely 
available to everybody anywhere and hence a powerful equilibrating force in the global 
economy. However, as we show, applied work based on this perspective soon confirmed that the 
optimistic scenario of this theory did not really fit the evidence, and this led to a search for 
alternative ways to understand the role of technology and innovation for economic development.  
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Another strand, which particularly gained currency during the 1980s and 1990s, although 
some contributions were older, was based on the work of several prominent historians (and other 
social scientists) who argued that in practice the successful exploitation of technology for 
development depends on the ability of a country to generate the necessary “capabilities” for 
doing so. What these capabilities are and how (and why) they matter are among the central 
questions addressed in the voluminous literature that has emerged and which we survey in the 
following. Some of the topics addressed in the “capability” literature, such as, for example, the 
role of institutions and policy for technological and economic development, are also central to 
the so-called “new growth theory” that developed from the mid 1980s onwards , and we discuss 
the implications of this approach for our topic towards the end of this section. 
 
 “Old” neoclassical growth theory: An optimistic scenario 
  
Intuitively, most people easily accept the idea that knowledge and economic development 
are intimately related, and hence that access to knowledge should be regarded as a vital factor for 
developing countries. However, this is not the way development used to be explained by 
economists. From the birth of the so-called “classical political economy” more than two hundred 
years ago, economists have focused on accumulated capital per worker when trying to explain 
differences in income or productivity. Similarly, differences in economic growth have been seen 
as reflecting different rates of capital accumulation. This perspective arguably reflects the 
important role played by “mechanization” as a mean for productivity advance during the so-
called (first) Industrial Revolution, the period during which the frame of reference for much 
economic reasoning was formed.  
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Closer to our own age, Robert Solow adopted this perspective in his so-called 
“neoclassical growth theory” (Solow 1956). Solow’s model was based on standard neoclassical 
assumptions, such as perfect competition (and information), maximizing behaviour, no 
externalities, positive and decreasing marginal products, absence of scale economies, etc. In this 
model, productivity growth results from increases in the amount of capital that each worker is set 
to operate. But as capital per worker increases the marginal productivity of capital declines, and 
with it the scope for further increases in the capital-labour ratio. Ultimately, the capital-labour 
ratio approaches a constant, and productivity growth ceases. In this long-run equilibrium gross 
domestic product, the capital stock and the labour force all grow at the same, exogenously 
determined rate.  
However, to allow for long-run growth in GDP per capita, Solow (1956) added an 
exogenous term, labelled "technological progress". In this interpretation, technology - or 
knowledge - is a "public" good, i.e., something that is accessible for everybody free of charge. 
Solow did not discuss the implications of this for a multi-country world but subsequent research 
based on the neoclassical perspective took it for granted that if technology - or knowledge - is 
freely available in, say, the USA, it will be so at the global level as well. The following remark 
by one of the leading empirical researchers in the field is typical in this respect: "Because 
knowledge is an international commodity, I should expect the contribution of advances of 
knowledge (...) to be of about the same size in all the countries..." (Denison 1967, p. 282). On 
this assumption the neoclassical model of economic growth predicts that, in the long run, GDP 
per capita in all countries will grow at the same, exogenously determined rate of global 
technological progress.  
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The only factor left within this framework that could explain differences in per capita 
growth across countries is so-called "transitional dynamics": since initial conditions generally 
differ, countries may grow at different rates in the process towards long-run equilibrium. A case 
can be made, then, for poor countries growing faster than the richer ones because countries 
where capital is scarce compared to labour (i.e., where the capital-labour ratio is low) should be 
expected to have a higher rate of return on capital, a higher rate of capital accumulation and 
higher per capita growth. To the extent that capital is internationally mobile and moves to the 
countries where the prospects for profits are highest, this tendency should be considerably 
strengthened. Hence, the gaps in income levels between rich and poor countries should be 
expected to narrow (so-called “convergence”) and - ultimately - disappear. 
It soon became clear, however, that this could not be the whole story. From the late 1950s 
onwards empirical research on factors affecting long run-growth grew steadily. Much in the 
same way as the post-war work on national accounts decomposed GDP into its constituent parts, 
the empirical research on growth attempted to decompose growth of GDP (so-called "growth 
accounting"). One of the first calculations of this kind was carried out by Moses Abramovitz 
(1956) in a historical study of US growth. His results indicated that only a small part of US 
productivity growth could be explained by factor growth. Thus, the major part of US 
productivity growth remained unexplained (the “residual”) and had to be classified as so-called 
total factor productivity growth. Abramovitz's comment was: "This result is surprising (...) Since 
we know little about the causes of productivity increase, the indicated importance of this element 
may be taken to be some sort of measure of our ignorance about the causes of economic growth". 
(Abramovitz 1956, p. 11). This result was soon corroborated by other studies (Solow 1957, 
Kendrick 1961 and Denison 1962) and has since been repeated many times for different data sets 
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(see Easterly and Levine 2001 for a good overview of the more recent evidence on the subject). 
Although several attempts have been made to "squeeze down the residual" as Nelson (1981) put 
it,1 the result – that a theory that only focuses on factor growth is unlikely to explain long run 
growth very well - is now generally accepted.  
Moreover, what came to be seen as the central prediction of theory – that convergence 
between rich and poor countries should be expected – was shown not to be consistent with the 
facts either (Islam 2003). In fact, the long run trend since the Industrial Revolution has been 
towards divergence, not convergence in productivity and income. For example, according to the 
economic historian David Landes, the difference in income or productivity per head between the 
richest and poorest country in the world has substantially increased over the last 250 years 
(Landes 1998). Although different sources may give different estimates for this increase, the 
qualitative interpretation remains the same. 
 
Knowledge and development 
 
This leads us back to where we started, namely the role of knowledge in growth. “Know-ledge,” 
or “knowing things,” may take many forms. It may be theoretical, based on an elaborate 
understanding of the phenomena under scrutiny. But it may also be practical, based on, say, 
cause-effect relationships that have been shown to hold in practice, although a total 
                                                 
1 Two avenues were followed “to squeeze down the residual”. One has been to embody, as much as possible, 
technological progress into the factors themselves by adjusting for shifts in quality, composition etc. (Denison 1962, 
Jorgenson and Griliches 1967, Maddison 1987). Another approach in this literature, originally developed by 
Denison (1962), has been to add other possible explanatory variables, such as structural change, economies of scale, 
etc. The list may in some cases be quite long. The reader is referred to the surveys by Maddison (1987) and 
Fagerberg (1994) for more detailed accounts. 
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understanding of the underlying causes may be lacking. It may be created through search or 
learning but it may also be acquired through education or training or simply by observing what 
others do and trying to imitate it. The creation (or acquisition) of knowledge does not require an 
economic motive (or effect), although this is quite common. The subset of knowledge that deals 
with how to produce and distribute goods and services, which is what interest economists most, 
is usually labelled “Technology.” An open question is whether the concept of technology only 
refers to knowledge about physical processes (“hardware”), or if it also includes knowledge 
about, say, how to organize/manage these (“software”). For the purpose of economic analysis, 
the latter, broad interpretation of the term is clearly the most meaningful. Arguably, mastery of 
physical processes is of dubious value if one doesn’t know how to embed these in a well-
organized production and distribution system. 
As mentioned in the introduction the role of technology – and hence innovation – for 
catch-up processes has been a highly controversial topic for at least a century. Torstein Veblen, 
who is often credited with being the first to provide an analytical framework for the analysis of 
catch-up processes, provides a useful starting point for our discussion. In his analysis of 
Germany’s catch-up vis-à-vis the then economically leading country, the UK, Veblen (1915) put 
forward the argument that recent technological changes had altered the conditions for 
industrialization in latecomer economies. In earlier times, he argued, the diffusion of technology 
had been hampered by the fact that technology was mostly embodied in persons, so that 
migration of skilled workers was a necessary prerequisite for its spread across different locations. 
However, with the advent of “machine technology”, as he put it, this logic had changed (op. cit., 
p. 191). In contrast to the conditions that had prevailed previously, Veblen argued, this new type 
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of knowledge “can be held and transmitted in definite and unequivocal shape, and the acquisition 
of it by such transfer is no laborious or uncertain matter” (ibid).  
Although Veblen did not use the terminology that is now commonly applied to the 
process he described, it is pretty clear what he had in mind. Effectively, what he was arguing is 
that while technology was previously “tacit” and embodied in persons, it later became more 
“codified” and easily transmittable. Hence, catch-up should be expected to be relatively easy, 
and was, under “otherwise suitable circumstances,” largely “a question of the pecuniary 
inducement and (…) opportunities offered by this new industry” (ibid., p. 192). Since the 
latecomers could take over the new technology “ready-made”, without having to share the costs 
of its development, this might be expected to be a very profitable affair (ibid, p. 249). This being 
the case, Veblen predicted that other European countries, e.g., France, Italy and Russia, would 
soon follow suit (he also mentioned the case of Japan). 
As noted this perspective of technology was later wholeheartedly adopted by standard 
neoclassical economics. Following that approach, knowledge should be seen as a body of 
information, freely available to all interested, that could be used over and over again (without 
being depleted). Obviously, if this is what knowledge is about, it should be expected to benefit 
everybody all over the globe to the same extent, and cannot be used to explain differences in 
growth and development. It is understandable, therefore, that the first systematic attempts to use 
knowledge to explain differences in economic development did not come from economics proper 
but from economic historians (many of whom came to look at knowledge or technology in a 
rather different way from the prevailing view in economics). Rather than something that exists in 
the public domain and can be exploited by anybody everywhere free of charge, technological 
knowledge, whether created through learning or organized R&D, is in this tradition seen as 
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deeply rooted in the specific capabilities of private firms and their networks/environments, and 
hence not easily transferable. Compared with the traditional neoclassical growth theory discussed 
earlier these writers painted a much bleaker picture of the prospects for catch-up. According to 
this latter view there is nothing automatic about catch up: it requires a lot of effort and 
capability-building on the part of the backward country. 
 
What it takes to catch up: The need for “new institutional instruments”  
 
The economic historian Alexander Gerschenkron set the stage for much of the subsequent 
literature (Gerschenkron 1962). Some countries are at the technological frontier, he pointed out, 
while others lag behind. Although the technological gap between a frontier country and a laggard 
represents “a great promise” for the latter, a potential for high growth through imitating frontier 
technologies, there are also various problems that may prevent backward countries from reaping 
the potential benefits to the full extent. His favourite example was the German attempt to catch 
up with the UK more than a century ago. When the UK industrialized, technology was relatively 
labour-intensive and small scale. But in the course of time technology became much more capital 
and scale intensive, so when Germany entered the scene, the conditions for entry had changed 
considerably. Because of this, Gerschenkron argued, Germany had to develop new institutional 
instruments for overcoming these obstacles, above all in the financial sector, “instruments for 
which there was little or no counterpart in an established industrial country.(ibid, p. 7)” He held 
these experiences to be valid also for other technologically lagging countries. 
Gerschenkron’s work is often associated with his focus on investment banks, which he 
saw as critical in mobilizing resources for development. However, as pointed out by Shin (1996), 
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it is possible to see his writings as an attempt to arrive at a more general understanding of the 
conditions for catch-up, focusing on the instruments - or capabilities to use a more recent term - 
that need to be in place for successful catch-up to take place and the roles that public and private 
sector actors may play in generating these capabilities. Shin (1996) also emphasizes the 
historically contingent nature of the capabilities needed for catch up. For example, the factors 
that constrained German catch-up towards the end of the nineteenth century are not necessarily 
the same as those experienced by Japan in the early post World War Two period or other Asian 
countries more recently. Hence, while the need for such capabilities may be a quite general 
phenomenon, their precise nature may well differ between historical time-periods, 
industries/sectors and levels of development. 
 
Social capability and absorptive capacity 
 
Moses Abramovitz, arguing along similar lines as Gerschenkron, also placed emphasis on the 
potential for catch-up2 by late-comers. He suggested that differences in countries’ abilities to 
exploit this potential might to some extent be explained with the help of two concepts, 
technological congruence and social capability.3 The first concept refers to the degree to which 
leader and follower country characteristics are congruent in areas such as market size, factor 
supply etc. For example, the technological system that emerged in the USA towards the end of 
the nineteenth century was highly dependent on access to a large, homogenous market, 
something that hardly existed in Europe at the time, which may help to explain its slow diffusion 
                                                 
2
 He defined it as follows: “This is a potential that reflects these countries’ greater opportunity to advance by 
borrowing and adapting the best practice technology and organization of more productive economies” (Abramovitz 
1994b, p. 87). 
3
 The term “social capability” comes from Ohkawa and Rosovsky (1973). 
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there. The second concept points to the capabilities that developing countries have to develop in 
order to catch up, such as improving education (particularly technical) and the business 
infrastructure (including the financial system). Abramovitz explained the successful catch up of 
Western Europe in relation to the US in the first half of the post World War Two period as the 
result of both increasing technological congruence and improved social capabilities. As an 
example of the former he mentioned how European economic integration led to the creation of 
larger and more homogenous markets in Europe, facilitating the transfer of scale-intensive 
technologies initially developed for US conditions. Regarding the latter, he pointed among other 
things to such factors as the general increases in educational levels and how effective the 
financial system had become in mobilizing resources for change.  
 The concept “social capability” soon became very popular in applied work. Nevertheless 
it is, as Abramovitz himself admitted, quite “vaguely” defined (Abramovitz 1994a, p. 25) and 
this has left a wide scope for different interpretations. But although Abramovitz found it hard to 
measure, it is not true that he lacked clear ideas about what the concept was intended to cover. 
These are some of the aspects that he considered to be particularly relevant (Abramovitz 1986, 
1994a, b): 
- technical competence (level of education)  
- experience in the organization and management of large scale enterprises 
- financial institutions and markets capable of mobilizing capital on a large scale  
- honesty and trust 
- the stability of government and its effectiveness in defining (enforcing) rules and 
supporting economic growth  
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 A related concept that has become popular concept in the applied literature on growth 
and development is “absorptive capacity”. The term itself is not new. In development economics 
it has been used for a long time, as the ability of a developing country to absorb new investments 
more generally (Adler 1965, Eckaus 1973). However, as the role of knowledge for growth and 
development became more widely recognized, it came to be associated with the ability to absorb 
knowledge. Rostow (1980, p. 267-277) summarized this new perspective well : “economic 
growth depends on the rate of absorption of the existing and unfolding stock of relevant 
knowledge; the rate of absorption depends on the availability of both trained men and capital; the 
reason for the accelerated growth among (…) middle-income countries is that they have built up 
the stock of trained man-power (including entrepreneurs) to a position where they can accelerate 
the rate of absorption of the existing stock of knowledge”.   
Wesley Cohen and Daniel Levinthal, in an influential contribution (Cohen and Levinthal 
1990), applied the concept to the firm level. They defined it as “the ability of a firm to recognize 
the value of new, external information, assimilate it and apply it to commercial ends” (ibid p. 
128). In this meaning of the term it became widely used in analyses of international technology 
spillovers, which we discuss below (Section 5). Cohen and Levinthal saw absorptive capacity as 
dependent on the firm’s prior related knowledge, which in turn was assumed to reflect its 
cumulative R&D. However, they also noted that the path dependent nature of cumulative 
learning might make it difficult for a firm to acquire new knowledge created outside its own 
specialized field, and that it therefore was important for firms to retain a certain degree of 
diversity in its knowledge base through, among other things, nurturing linkages with holders of 
knowledge outside its own organization.   
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Although the focus of Cohen and Levinthal was on firms, many of the same 
considerations apply, as emphasized above, at more aggregate levels, such as regions or 
countries (Keller 1996, Eaton and Kortum 1999, Griffith et al. 2004), and the term has  been 
widely used. It should be noted, however, that the concept as used by Cohen and Levinthal 
combines three different processes into one, namely (1) search, (2) assimilation (or absorption) 
of what is found and (3) its commercial application. Hence, it refers not only to “absorption” in 
the received meaning of the term, but also on the ability to exploit and create knowledge more 
generally. The authors defend this by arguing - with reference to relevant psychological literature 
- that the ability to assimilate existing and the ability to create new knowledge are so similar so 
there is no point in distinguishing between them (ibid, p. 130). In contrast, Zahra and George 
(2002), in a review of the literature, argue that the skills required for creating and managing 
knowledge differ from those related to its exploitation and that the two therefore deserve to be 
treated and measured separately. They term the latter “transformative capacity”. In a similar vein 
Fagerberg (1988) and Fagerberg, et al. (2007) distinguish between a country’s ability to compete 
on technology (what they term “technology competitiveness”) and its ability to exploit 
technology commercially independently of where it was first created (so-called “capacity 
competitiveness”). 
 
Technological capability 
 
Gerschenkron and Abramovitz focused mainly on evidence from Europe and the United States. 
But from the 1970s onwards several studies of catch-up (or lack of such) in other parts of the 
world emerged. For example there is by now an ample literature demonstrating that the catch-up 
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of not only Japan (Johnson 1982) but also other so-called “newly industrializing countries” in 
Asia (Amsden 1989, Wade 1990, Hobday 1995, Kim 1997, Nelson and Pack 1999, Kim and 
Nelson 2000) was associated with conscious capability building. One case which received much 
attention was the rise of Korea from being one of the poorest countries in the world to a first 
world technological powerhouse in just three decades. Linsu Kim, who made the authoritative 
study on the subject, used the concept “technological capability” (Kim 1980) as an analytical 
device to interpret the Korean evidence. He defined it as “the ability to make effective use of 
technological knowledge in efforts to assimilate, use, adapt and change existing technologies. It 
also enables one to create new technologies and to develop new products and processes…” (Kim 
1997, p. 4). Hence, the concept includes not only organized R&D, which arguably is a small 
activity in many developing countries, but also other capabilities needed for the commercial 
exploitation of technology. Kim’s notion of technological capability embraces the notion of 
absorptive capacity as discussed above, i.e., it considers assimilation and adaptation of “existing 
knowledge” as key in the catching-up process.4  
Kim’s analyses were based on lessons from how Korean electronics firms, such as 
Samsung, gradually upgraded from a passive role of implementing imported technology, to a 
more active role of introducing incremental improvements, and eventually ventured into the 
forefront of innovation-based competition in the industry (the implementation-assimilation-
improvement sequence). He expected the requirements to become more stringent, in particular 
with respect to innovation capabilities, as countries climb up the development ladder. Thus, 
following this view, for a firm or country in the process of catching up, the appropriate level of 
                                                 
4
 In fact, the definition of technological capabilities by Kim is quite similar to that of absorptive capacity by Cohen 
and Levinthal (1990). Kim (1997) uses the two concepts interchangeably. 
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technological capability would be a moving target, in constant need of improvement (Bell and 
Pavitt 1993).  
It has become common in the literature (see, e.g., Dahlman et al, 1987, Kim 1997, 
Romijn 1999) to consider three aspects of technological capability: production capability, 
investment capability and innovation capability. Production capability is needed to operate 
productive facilities efficiently and to adapt production to changing market circumstances. 
Investment capability is needed to establish new productive facilities and adjust project designs 
to suit the circumstances of the investment. Finally, innovation capability is required to create 
new technology, e.g., develop new products or services that better meet the specific  
requirements of the market.  
 The origin of the technological capability concept can be traced back to a project on 
“The Acquisition of Technological Capability” organized by Larry Westphal at the World Bank 
in the late 1970s, involving among others Alice Amsden, Jorge Katz, Linsu Kim and Sanjaya 
Lall. The concept has since been used in a large number of studies at various levels of 
aggregation. Initially many studies following this approach concentrated on understanding the 
rapid technological catching up in East Asia (Kim, 1980, 1997, Fransman 1982, Amsden, 1989, 
Hobday 1995) and the lack of it elsewhere, such as in Latin America (Teitel 1981, Katz 1984, 
Fransman and King 1984), India (Lall 1987) or the former centrally planned economies (Hanson 
and Pavitt 1987). Similar concepts that were proposed at the time, but did not receive the same 
recognition, include “technological mastery” (Dahlman and Westphal 1981, Fransman 1982) and 
“technological effort” (Dahlman and Westphal 1982).5 
                                                 
5
 For good overviews of this literature see Dahlman and Westphal (1982), Fransman and King (1984), Evenson and 
Westphal (1995), Romijn (1999), Figueiredo (2001), Dutrenit (2004). For the early literature see also the special 
issues of World Development (no. 5-6, 1984) and Journal of Development Economics, (no. 1-2, 1984). For a more 
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Although initially developed for analysis of firms, the concept has also been applied to 
whole industries or countries. Sanjaya Lall, in a survey (Lall 1992), emphasized three aspects of 
“national technological capability” as he phrased it: the ability to muster the necessary (financial) 
resources and use them efficiently; skills, including not only general education but also 
specialized managerial and technical competence; and what he called “national technological 
effort”, which he associated with measures such as R&D, patents and technical personnel. He 
noted that national technological capability does not only depend on domestic technological 
efforts but also foreign technology acquired through imports of machinery or foreign direct 
investments. Lall also made a distinction between technological capabilities proper and their 
economic effects. These effects, he noted, did also depend on the incentives that economic 
agents face whether resulting from political decision making (e.g., governance) or embedded in 
more long-lasting institutions (the legal framework for example). This reasoning is of course 
very similar to that of Abramovitz. Hence, potentially there is a considerable overlap between the 
concepts of technological and social capabilities: both include aspects related to skill formation 
and finance. We consider the implications of this in more detail in the next section.  
The successful catch-up of a number of “newly industrializing” countries in the 1970s 
and 1980s also served as inspiration for the development of new perspectives on the dynamics of 
the global economy that placed the development of appropriate technological activities (or 
capabilities) at the core of the analysis (Fagerberg 1987, 1988, Dosi et al. 1990, Verspagen 1991, 
for an overview see Fagerberg and Godinho 2004). Fagerberg (1987, 1988) has suggested an 
empirical model based on Schumpeterian logic that includes innovation, imitation and other 
efforts related to the commercial exploitation of technology as driving forces of growth. 
                                                                                                                                                             
recent account see the special issues of Oxford Development Studies (no. 3, 2004) and International Journal of 
Technology Management (no. 1/2/3, 2006). 
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Following this approach, catch-up or convergence is by no means guaranteed. It depends on the 
balance of innovation and imitation, how challenging these activities are and the extent to which 
countries are equipped with the necessary capabilities. According to Verspagen (1991), who 
implemented similar ideas into a non-linear setting that allows for both catch-up and a “low-
growth trap”, poor countries with a low “social capability” are the ones at risk of being 
“trapped”. Moreover, evidence presented in Fagerberg and Verspagen (2002) suggests that the 
importance of innovation for development is increasing with time, highlighting the urgency of 
the matter for policy makers in the developing world. 
 
National innovation systems 
 
The observation that technological and social factors interact in the process of economic 
development might also be taken as supporting the view that a broader, more systemic approach 
that take such interactions into account is required.6 Such concerns led during the 1980s and 
1990s to the development of a new systemic approach to the study of countries’ abilities to 
generate and profit from technology, the so-called “national innovation system” approach. The 
concept, first used in public by Christopher Freeman in an analysis of Japan (Freeman 1987), 
soon became a popular analytical tool for researchers who wanted to get a firmer grasp on the 
interaction processes underlying a country’s technological and economic development (Lundvall 
1992, Nelson 1993, see Edquist 2004 for an overview). Organizations such as the OECD, the EU 
and the UN intensified their efforts to provide relevant statistics with which performance along 
these lines could be assessed. But the adoption of the innovation system approach to developing 
                                                 
6
 Edquist (2004, p. 182), in a survey, argues that national systems of innovation should include “all important 
economic, social, political, organizational, institutional, and other factors that influence the development, diffusion, 
and use of innovations”. 
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countries is a relatively recent phenomenon (Viotti 2002, Muchie et al. 2003, Lundvall et al. 
2006) and arguably still in its infancy. 
Moreover, there is currently no agreement in the literature on how innovation systems 
should be defined and studied empirically. Some researchers in this area emphasise a need for 
developing a common methodology, based on the functions and activities of the system, to guide 
empirical work (Liu and White 2001, Johnson and Jacobsson 2003 and Edquist 2004), while 
others advocate the advantage of keeping the approach open and flexible (Lundvall 2007).  
 
New growth theory 
 
During the 1980s and 1990s economists’ interest in the possible role of knowledge (technology) 
for growth and development increased. On the theoretical front an important development was 
the emergence of the so-called “new growth theory” (Romer 1986, 1990, Aghion and Howitt 
1992, 1998) according to which differences in economic development across countries should be 
understood as the outcome of differences in endogenous knowledge accumulation within (largely 
national) borders. Although some newly created technological knowledge may spill over from 
one country to another, there are according to this approach sufficient impediments to this 
process (being legal, such as intellectual property rights (IPRs), or more informal in nature) to 
secure that in most cases the lion’s share of the benefits will accrue to the innovator. Hence, 
following this approach, long run economic growth should to a large extent be expected to 
depend on appropriability conditions and the enforcement of intellectual property rights. The 
increasing attention to IPRs in both developed and developing countries and their mutual 
relationship (for example the TRIPS agreement, see Granstrand 2004) may to some extent reflect 
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this shift of emphasis in economic theorizing. Moreover, the theory predicts that large countries 
should be expected to be more innovative, and benefit more from innovation, than small 
countries. However, according to the theory, the latter may to some extent overcome the 
disadvantages of scale by practicing free trade and taking a liberal stance towards international 
capital flows. Hence, following this approach, openness to trade and foreign investment is 
essential for countries that wish to catch up (Grossman and Helpman 1991, Coe and Helpman 
1995, Coe et al. 1997). 
However, although it is widespread view that openness to trade is a positive factor for 
growth, the evidence supporting this conclusion is quite weak (Rodrik and Rodriguez 1999, 
Rodrik et al. 2004, Fagerberg and Srholec 2008). In fact, it appears to be a fairly robust result in 
the literature that the degree of openness to international transactions, given by imports, inward 
FDI or royalty and license payments abroad, does not discriminate well between countries that 
manage to escape the low development trap and those that continue to be poor. This does not 
mean knowledge flows across borders are not important for growth and development. We 
discuss this in more detail in Section 5 of this chapter. 
  
Capabilities and beyond  
 
As our survey so far shows, there is by now a relatively large conceptual and applied literature 
on the role of capabilities in development. However, as should be evident from the discussion, 
scholars in this area have suggested alternative concepts that are to some extent overlapping and 
often difficult to operationalize. How can measures for concepts such as technological and social 
capability be defined or constructed? And how should the close relationship between 
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technological capability proper and the broader social, institutional and political framework, e.g., 
“social capability,” be taken into account in empirical work? The importance of these matters 
can hardly be questioned. Abramovitz, who pioneered much of this work, was, as noted above, 
quite pessimistic about the prospects for examining these questions empirically in a rigorous 
manner, but as we shall see, the availability of indicators has improved a lot in recent years, not 
the least for “non-economic” aspects of development, and recent research has made real progress 
in dealing with these important and challenging issues.  
 
27 
 
 
3. Measuring national capabilities 
 
As is evident from the preceding section, conceptual work on the role of “capabilities” and 
“innovation systems” for development has flourished during the last few decades. But to what 
extent can these concepts be operationalized empirically? Trying to put numbers on such 
concepts may be a difficult exercise, as Archibugi and Coco (2005) point out. Still there have 
been some attempts in that direction and in this section we will discuss this possibility in more 
detail. For example, Furman et al. (2002) and Furman and Hayes (2004) have suggested 
measuring a country’s innovation system (or its “innovative capacity” as they put it) through the 
number of patents and find that there are large differences in this respect across countries at 
similar levels of income. However, patents refer to inventions, not innovations, and are used 
much more intensively in some industries than others. In fact, the global novelty requirement 
associated with patents implies that minor innovations/adaptations, which arguably make up the 
bulk of innovative activity world-wide, will not be counted since these are simply not patentable. 
Moreover, costs, both financial and opportunity, and the fact that in any case, their domestic IP 
systems may not function very well, may also lead to their low usage by inventors in developing 
countries. Thus, for countries below the technology frontier, and developing countries in 
particular, most of their innovative activities would get unrecognized by this approach. Most 
attempts to measure national technological capabilities or innovation systems in developing 
countries therefore try to take into account more information than just patents.  
While commendable, and consistent with suggestions in the literature, taking into account 
more information also represents a challenge, both with respect to data availability and in terms 
of method. Such exercises easily run into problems because, typically, most developed market 
economies figure prominently among those with good coverage, while developing countries and 
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former socialist economies often lack data on many potentially useful indicators. Based on the 
preceding discussion, Table 1, adapted from Fagerberg and Srholec (2008), presents an overview 
of various factors that has been identified in the relevant literature as being particularly relevant 
for the measurement of technological and social capabilities along with examples of possible 
empirical indicators.  
 
Table 1. Measuring capabilities 
 
Dimension Measure 
Science, research 
and innovation 
Scientific publications, patents, R&D (total/business), 
innovation counts 
Openness Openness to trade, foreign direct investment, research 
cooperation/alliances with foreign partners, 
technology licensing, immigration 
Production 
quality/standards  
International (ISO) standards, total quality 
management (TQM), lean production, just-in-time 
ICT infrastructure Telecommunications, internet, computers 
Finance Access to bank credit, stock-market, venture capital 
Skills  Primary, secondary and tertiary education, 
managerial and technical skills 
Quality of 
governance 
Corruption, law and order, independence of courts, 
property rights, business friendly regulation 
Social values Civic activities, trust, tolerance, altruism, 
conservatism, religious ethics, attitudes towards 
technology and science 
 
  
  
As discussed earlier, the concept of technological capability refers to the ability to 
develop, search for, absorb and exploit knowledge commercially. An important element of this is 
what Kim (1997) termed “innovation capability.” There are several data sources that capture 
different aspects of this. For example, the quality of a country’s science base, on which invention 
and innovation activities to some extent depend, may be reflected in articles published in 
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scientific and technical journals. Research and development (R&D) expenditures measure some 
(but not all) resources that are used for developing new products or processes, while patents 
count (patentable) inventions coming out of that process. However, R&D data are not available 
for many developing countries. Patent data, on the other hand, are available for all countries but 
as noted above many if not most innovations are never patented. So, as for many other 
indicators, this gives only a partial view of what we wish to measure. Firms’ own judgments 
about their innovativeness (innovation counts) is another possible source of information but such 
data are only available for a relatively small number of countries and a limited time span (see, 
however, the next section, and the chapter by Mairesse and Mohnen, this volume).  
Openness (or interaction) across country borders may facilitate technology transfer 
(spillovers) and stimulate innovation. This issue is as mentioned above particularly emphasized 
in work inspired by the “new growth theories”. The applied literature on the subject has mostly 
focused on four channels of technology transfer across country borders : trade, foreign direct 
investment, migration and licensing (for overviews see Cincera and Van Pottelsberghe 2001, 
Keller 2004 and this volume). Some of these data sources are in scarce supply for developing 
countries, especially the latter two, with predictable consequences for the research that has been 
carried out on this subject. We discuss this issue in more detail in Section 5 of this chapter. 
Another important aspect of technological capability mentioned by Kim (1997) is 
“production capability.” A possible indicator of this might be the adoption of quality standards 
(ISO 9000). Although ISO certification is mainly procedural in nature, it is increasingly seen as a 
requirement for firms supplying high quality markets, and is therefore likely to reflect a high 
emphasis on quality in production. Moreover, although earlier studies such as Lall (1992) did not 
place much emphasis on capabilities in ICT, nowadays a well-developed ICT infrastructure must 
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be regarded as a critical factor for a country that wish to catch up. Arguably this holds not only 
for production capability but for the ability to innovate as well. Possible indicators reflecting ICT 
use may be number of personal computers, internet users and fixed/mobile phone subscribers. 
These indicators are available for most countries. 
The important role that a country’s financial system may play in mobilizing resources for 
catching-up was pointed out already by Gerschenkron, Abramovitz and Lall. Kim included this 
in his definition of “investment capability.” It is also emphasized by a host of recent research 
(see, e.g., King and Levine 1993, Levine 1997, Levine and Zervos 1998). Authors in the 
capability literature attached a qualitative dimension to this that is difficult to measure with the 
available data. What we can measure is the (quantitative) development of the financial sector of a 
country, for example as reflected in the amount of credit (to the private sector) or by 
capitalization of companies listed in domestic capital markets.  
A different set of factors, emphasized by for example Abramovitz and Lall, and for which 
there is solid support in the literature, relates to education and skills (Nelson and Phelps 1966, 
Barro 1991, Verspagen 1991, Benhabib and Spiegel 1994; for an overview see Krueger and 
Lindahl 2001). Both Abramovitz and Lall were especially concerned about specialized 
managerial and technical skills but this is again an example of information that is hard to come 
by, especially for a broad sample of countries on different levels of development. What is 
available for most countries are more basic education statistics such as the literacy rate, the 
teacher-pupil ratio in primary schools and the rates of enrolment in secondary and tertiary 
education.  
The importance of governance and institutions, furnishing economic agents with 
incentives for creation and diffusion of knowledge, is generally acknowledged in the literature. 
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Although such factors often defy “hard” measurement, especially in a broad cross-country 
comparison, there exist some survey-based measures, often collected by international 
organisations, that may throw some light on these issues. We find it useful, however, to draw a 
distinction between, on the one hand, the “quality of governance” with respect to innovation and 
economic life more generally and the character of the political system on the other. For the 
former, which is what we will focus on here, survey data reflect how easy it is to set up and 
operate a business, whether property rights exist and are enforced, how widespread corruption is 
conceived to be, the extent to which law and order prevails and courts are seen as being 
independent. All these aspects are potentially important for innovation and may, to some extent 
at least, be achieved within quite different political systems.  
However, the impact of government’s actions on innovation activities and development 
outcomes may as pointed out by Abramovitz also depend on the prevailing social values in 
society such as, for example, tolerance, honesty, trust and civic engagement. Such values, 
facilitating socially beneficial, cooperative activities, are often seen as expressions of so-called 
“social capital” (Putnam 1993, for an overview see Woolcock and Narayan 2000). The fact that 
the type of factors taken up by the literature on social capital may matter for economic 
development is widely accepted. For instance, Kenneth Arrow pointed out more than three 
decades ago that “It can plausibly be argued that much of the economic backwardness in the 
world can be explained by lack of mutual confidence” (Arrow 1972, p. 357). The problem is 
rather how to measure it. One possible source of information that has been exploited to throw 
some light on the issue is the “World Value Survey”. Knack and Keefer (1997) used such data to 
analyze the relationship between trust, norms of civic behaviour and membership in groups on 
the one hand and economic growth on the other for a sample of 29 (mostly developed) countries. 
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However, the limited time and country coverage of these data has, until recently at least, 
precluded its extension to a sizeable part of the developing world.  
Given the relatively large number of potentially useful indicators there is obviously a lot 
of information to exploit when attempting to use these data to measure the various capabilities 
identified in the literature. One of the key challenges is how to combine this rich information into 
a smaller number of dimensions (e.g., capabilities) with a clear-cut economic interpretation. The 
most widely used approach to construct composite variables is to select relevant indicators and 
weigh them together using predetermined (usually equal) weights (Archibugi and Coco, 2005). 
The problem in this case is that the choice of weights tends to be quite arbitrary. An alternative 
approach, pioneered by Adelman and Morris (1965, 1967), uses so-called “factor analysis” 
(Basilevsky 1994) to advise on questions like these. This method is based on the very simple 
idea that indicators referring to the same dimension are likely to be strongly correlated, and that 
we may use this insight to reduce the complexity of a large data set (consisting of many 
indicators) into a small number of composite variables, each reflecting a specific dimension of 
variance in the data. 
Fagerberg and Srholec (2008) used factor analysis on data for 115 countries and 25 
indicators between 1992 -2004. The analysis led to the selection of four principal factors jointly 
explaining about three quarter of the total variance of the set of indicators. The first (and 
quantitatively most important) of these loaded highly on several indicators associated with 
“technological capability” such as patenting, scientific publications, ICT infrastructure, ISO 
9000 certifications and access to finance. However, it also correlated highly with education, so it 
cut across the distinction in the literature between “technological” (Kim 1997) and “social” 
capabilities (Abramovitz 1986). They suggested to interpret it as a synthetic measure of the 
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capabilities (or “factors”) influencing the “development, diffusion and use of innovations”, 
quoting Edquist (2004)’s definition of an innovation system, hence the name “innovation 
system” for this factor. Their findings are reproduced in Figure 1 below, which plots the 
innovation system factor score against GDP per capita for the countries covered by their 
investigation. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. GDP per capita and innovation system (average level over 2002-2004) 
Source: Fagerberg and Srholec (2008) 
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As is evident from the graph there is very close correlation between the “innovation 
system variable” and economic development as reflected in GDP per capita. To the extent that 
there are deviations from the regression line this primarily comes from a group of resource rich 
economies (OPEC countries for instance), having slightly higher GDP per capita levels than the 
quality of their innovation systems would indicate, and some of the former centrally-planned 
economies for which it is the other way around. Fagerberg and Srholec’s study indicates that the 
most advanced innovation systems are to be found in smaller countries (in terms of population) 
such as Australia, Denmark and Norway.7 These three countries, it may be noted, are low by 
international standards not only on patents but also on R&D, still they excel economically. 
Fagerberg and Srholec (2008) suggest that the explanation for this difference may be that these 
countries have well developed capabilities for exploiting knowledge. 
Table 2 presents a comparison of different composite variables aiming at measuring 
(national) technological and/or social capabilities (activities). The ArCo measure, developed by 
Archibugi and Coco (2004), was constructed as the average of eight different indicators 
reflecting various aspects of technological capability (patents, publications, ICT, electricity 
consumption and education) for 162 countries in the late 1980s and 1990s. Hence it is by design 
a relatively broad measure. The technology and capacity competitiveness indexes developed by 
Fagerberg et al. (2007), were developed with similarly broad purpose in mind, as reflecting 
capabilities necessary for exploration and exploitation of technology, respectively. The 
SOCDEV variable, initially developed by Adelman and Morris (1965) and later updated by 
Temple and Johnson (1998), is an amalgam of structural indicators (share of agriculture, 
urbanization etc.), socio-economic characteristics (role of middle class, social mobility, literacy 
                                                 
7
 This result differs from those reported by Furman et al. (2002) and Furman and Hayes (2004) which, based on 
evidence from patent statistics, emphasize large economies such as the US, Japan and Germany as being among the 
global leaders.  
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etc.) and the development of mass communication (measured through the spread of newspapers 
and radios in the population). Temple and Johnson (1998) suggest using this as a measure of 
“social capability” or, alternatively, “social capital.” Finally, the Human Development Index is 
assumed to reflect the level of “social” development (e.g., welfare) as reflected in statistics on 
health and education (UNDP, 2004).  
 
 
Table 2. Correlation between measures of national capabilities 
 
 Indicator Reference Reference 
period 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
(1) ArCo Archibugi and 
Coco (2004) 
2000  0.90 0.93 0.92 0.85 0.89 
(2) Innovation system Fagerberg and 
Srholec (2008) 
2000-04 115  0.74 0.85 0.89 0.96 
(3) Technology 
competitiveness 
Fagerberg, et al. 
(2007) 
2002 90 79  0.84 0.53 0.72 
(4) Capacity 
competitiveness 
Fagerberg, et al. 
(2007) 
2002 90 79 90  0.69 0.87 
(5) SOCDEV Temple and 
Johnson (1998) 
1957-62 73 57 53 53  0.88 
(6) Human 
development 
index 
UNDP (2004) 2004 154 114 89 89 68  
 
Note: Above the diagonal is the correlation coefficient between pairs of measures and below the diagonal is for each 
of these pairs the number of (common) observations. 
 
The main thing to be noted from Table 2 is the very close correlation between these 
measures. For example, the correlation coefficient between the ArCo and the Innovation System 
measures is 0.90. Hence the ranking implied by these measures appears robust. Second, there is a 
very close correlation between these measures and the Human development index, which to 
some extent is to be expected due to their overlapping nature. It is also consistent with the 
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finding in the literature of a close relationship between technological and social capabilities 
(Fagerberg and Srholec 2008).  
The finding that economic development and capability building go hand in hand is 
suggestive. But correlation, it may be noted, is in itself no proof of causation. Fagerberg and 
Srholec (2008) provided some evidence (in the form of econometric tests) supporting the 
proposition that capability building affects development positively. However, since many of the 
relevant data sources used to measure capability-building exist only for a few years (and in some 
cases for a single year only), there is very limited scope for causality testing. Hence the 
possibility that economic development in some sense affects capability building (or some aspects 
of it) positively cannot be excluded. As longer time series become available for many relevant 
data sources, it will be possible to learn more about these relationships and this is an important 
topic for future research.  
Capability building may also be influenced by long-run factors related to the history of 
the country (Acemoglu, et al. 2001, 2002), its geography or nature (Gallup et al. 1999, Masters 
and MacMillan 2001, Bloom et al. 2003, Alesina et al. 2003, Sachs et al. 2004). Failing to take 
this into account may lead to biased inferences (with respect to policy, for instance). Fagerberg 
and Srholec (2008) found that unfavourable factors related to history, geography and nature did 
indeed influence the possibility of developing a well-working innovation system negatively. 
They saw this as an additional argument for developing aid because it confirmed that some 
countries are much worse placed than others for reasons beyond the control of people living 
today (or their politicians). 
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4. Firm-level innovation in developing countries 
  
In this section we move from the macro to the micro level; from the technological capabilities of 
countries to the innovation activities in firms. Traditionally, indigenous firms in developing 
countries have been portrayed as passive adopters of foreign technologies. However, as 
emphasized in Section 2, from the late 1970s insights about how firms operate started to reveal 
that technological catching up required more than just import of capital goods. As the research 
has shown, even basic production capabilities cannot be taken for granted in the developing part 
of the world, and hence need to be created (Kim 1980, Teitel 1981, Fransman 1982, Dahlman 
and Westphal, 1982, Katz 1984 among others). Moreover, conditions in developing countries 
often turn out to be quite different from those in which the technology was originally developed, 
so that to be able to put it into efficient use, local firms need to adapt the imported technology to 
differences in inputs, tastes, customs and cultures (Evenson and Westphal, 1995). In the process 
of doing so, creation of new knowledge and innovation may occur. 
Arguably, a very sharp distinction between innovation and diffusion (or imitation), may 
not be very useful in the context of developing countries (Bell and Pavitt, 1993). Typically what 
happens, also in developed country settings, is that innovation tends to continue during the 
diffusion phase (Rosenberg 1972, Metcalfe 1988). So, even though firms in developing countries 
do depend heavily on diffusion of technology developed elsewhere, there may still be substantial 
scope for innovation and growth by improving the imported technology (Fransman 1982, Voss 
1988, Hobday 1995, Kim 1997). Such incremental or minor innovations consist of context-
specific improvements along the prevailing technological trajectories. However, although minor 
in a technological sense, these improvements can be of major economic significance (Hall 2004). 
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 It also needs to be emphasized that technological capability in developing country firms 
is much more than R&D. As Bell and Pavitt (1993) have pointed out, most firms in developing 
countries innovate on the basis of a broad range of capabilities. These are, they argue, typically 
concentrated in the departments of maintenance, engineering or quality control (rather than in, 
say, a R&D department). This does not mean, however, that R&D is  unimportant. For example, 
Kim (1980) emphasized the role of R&D efforts for firms’ ability to assimilate foreign 
technology, especially at more advanced stages of development. Of great importance according 
to Kim (1980) is also dense interaction with other firms or organizations in the local environment 
– so-called “linkage” capabilities in the terms of Lall (1992) – which may help to unlock the 
internal constraints for innovation that often hinder firms in developing countries with 
insufficient internal technological capabilities to succeed in their endeavours. This, of course, 
concurs with the emphasis in recent literature (see Section 2) on seeing firms’ innovation 
activities from a systemic perspective.  
Figueiredo (2006), in a recent survey, points out that our knowledge about innovation in 
developing country firms has been constrained by the fact that the available evidence has been 
overwhelmingly qualitative in character. In general, these studies seldom comprise more than a 
small number of case-studies, mainly of large firms, in a single industry or country. Definitions, 
typologies and ways of measurement tend to vary from one study to another, creating problems 
for comparative work and efforts to generalize the findings. This state of affairs has also made it 
difficult to carry out statistical tests of the various hypotheses that have been asserted in the 
literature about innovation processes in developing countries.  
It should be noted, though, that until recently, this situation applied to advanced countries 
as well. But from the early 1990s onwards efforts were made to collect more information on 
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innovation activities of firms through surveys based on the so-called Oslo Manual (Smith 2004). 
In the beginning these surveys were mostly confined to member states of the European 
Community, hence the label “Community Innovation Surveys” (CIS), but more recently a 
number of non-European countries, including some developing ones, have started to collect the 
same type of information (UNU-INTECH 2004, Blankley et al. 2006).  
According to the third edition of the Oslo Manual (OECD, 2005, p. 46) “an innovation is 
the implementation of a new or significantly improved product (good or service), or process, a 
new marketing method, or a new organisational method in business practices, workplace 
organisation or external relations.” Arguably, this broad definition of innovation is close to the 
one originally offered by Schumpeter (1934). However, in the CIS survey it suffices for the 
innovation to be new to the firm, it does not necessarily have to be new to the market or to the 
world as a whole. Thus innovation in this sense includes activities that Schumpeter would have 
classified as imitation.8 This departs somewhat from the Schumpeterian perspective, based on a 
relatively sharp distinction between innovation and imitation, but is consistent with the emphasis 
on incremental innovation and the close relationship between innovation and diffusion 
emphasized in the recent literature. However, from a comparative perspective this entirely 
subjective definition of innovation may also create problems, because something that would 
qualify as an innovation in one context may not do so in another.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8
 See Fagerberg (2003, 2004) for an extended discussion of the Schumpeterian contribution and different definitions 
of innovation. 
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Stylized facts 
 
In Europe, several innovation surveys have been already conducted, from the early 1990s 
onwards. The results indicated a clear correlation between innovative activity and the level of 
development: the higher the level of GDP per capita the higher the share of firms reporting to 
take part in innovation activates. However, although innovation, especially of the product type, 
tends to be more frequent in more economically advanced settings, the figures also reveal that 
innovation is a quite widely dispersed phenomenon, not limited to the most developed parts of 
the EU.  
Table 3 summarizes results from innovation surveys in non-EU/EFTA countries. It 
should be emphasized, however, that the figures should be treated with some caution, because 
there are differences in formulation of the questions, length of the reference period and sampling 
methods (UNU-INTECH 2004). For example, some of these surveys have been limited to the 
manufacturing sector, for which the frequency of innovation is known to be higher than in the 
rest of the economy. Nevertheless, the result that innovation is quite frequent also in developing 
economies seems to be supported. About one fourth of firms reported to have innovated in 
China, where the survey conformed to high quality standards, and the results from Brazil or 
Turkey were not very different. Some developing countries reported even higher innovation 
rates, but these surveys often had poor response rates and/or relatively small samples, which 
raise questions about their representativeness. In other cases, such as Japan, Thailand and Russia, 
the figures are markedly lower, though. In the two former cases this may have to do with the fact 
that the reference period was confined to a single year, which has implications for the propensity 
of firms to provide a positive answer. In the Russian case, however, several innovation surveys 
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have been conducted with broadly similar results, indicating that the low level of innovation 
activity reported there may be a real phenomenon. 
 
Table 3: Innovation surveys in non-European countries 
 
 
% of firms with new of 
significantly improved 
  
GDP 
per 
capita 
Res-
ponse 
rate 
Number 
of 
respon-
dents 
Refe-
rence 
Period Product Process 
Australia 28,689 82% .. 01-03 17 23 
New Zealand 22,760 80% 5,595 04-05 30 29 
Canadaa) 28,686 72% 6,143 02-04 48 50 
Chinaa) 6,043 82% 31,436 04-06 25 25 
Japan 26,063 21% 9,257 03 17 12 
Koreaa) 18,271 61% .. 02-04 36 23 
Malaysiaa) 8,496 19% 749 00-01 32 27 
Taiwan 18,247 34% 3,356 98-00 28 33 
Thailand 7,091 43% 2,582 03 6 5 
Argentinaa) 12,189 76% 1,688 98-01 46 47 
Brazil 7,196 .. 10,600 01-03 20 27 
Chilea) 9,103 15% 706 99-01 43 40 
Mexicoa) 9,038 69% 1,515 99-00 27 24 
Uruguaya) 7,981 98% 814 01-03 23 26 
Russia 8,387 .. .. 02-04 Less than 10% 
South Africa 9,290 37% 979 02-04 42 35 
Tunisia 6,812 79% 586 02-04 51 49 
Turkey 7,460 .. .. 04-06 22 23 
 
Note: a Manufacturing firms only. 
Source: National statistical offices and other sources. 
 
Another source of information on innovation in developing countries that deserves 
mentioning is the Productivity and Investment Climate Survey (PICS) of the World Bank. In this 
survey, which covers around 50,000 firms in more than 100 (mostly) developing countries, firms 
were asked about various aspects of their business activities, including innovation and learning 
(World Bank 2003). Table 4 summarizes some of the results with respect to innovation and 
development (GDP per capita in PPP). Since we are concerned about the representativeness of 
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the data, we include only datasets of around one thousand (or more) observations, which reduces 
the evidence to about two dozen surveys. Another concern is that despite the fact that these 
surveys are coordinated by the World Bank, the questions about innovation have changed 
between different vintages of the questionnaire, which may have an impact on the reported 
results. To control for these differences, we group together countries with similar definitions.9 
                                                 
9
 For example, in China, the first entry in the table, firms were asked whether they “entered new business line” and 
“introduced new process improvements”. Firms in Brazil and other countries in the second group of countries in the 
table were asked variations around questions whether they “developed (successfully) a major new product line” and 
“acquired new technology that either substantially changed the way the main products are produced or allowed the 
production of new products”. Much broader definitions were used in the most recent wave of the surveys, included 
in the group at the bottom of the table, referring to “any new or significantly improved products” and “any new or 
significantly improved production processes including methods of supplying services and ways of delivering 
products”. 
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Table 4: Evidence on innovation from Productivity and Investment Climate 
Surveys organized by the World Bank 
 
% of firms that innovated 
Country GDP per 
capita 
Number of 
firms 
Reference 
period 
Product Process 
China 2,496 1,498 98-00 21 30 
China 2,787 2,375 99-02 24 33 
Brazil a 7,883 1,640 97-02 68 68 
Egypt a 4,332 977 02-03 15 11 
Egypt a 4,687 995 04-05 19 .. 
India a 2,004 2,240 03-04 40 16 
Morocco a 3,107 831 00-02 25 35 
Poland 12,488 968 02-04 35 34 
Thailand a 5,933 1,385 01-02 50 52 
Thailand a 7,224 1,042 05-06 48 46 
Turkey a 9,302 1,323 03-04 36 42 
Vietnam a 1,942 1,149 03-04 44 45 
Bangladesh a 1,071 1,201 04-06 33 45 
Mexico a 11,142 1,119 03-05 35 34 
Nigeria a 1,736 945 04-06 54 53 
Turkey 10.870 1,148 05-07 45 .. 
Ukraine 6,048 848 05-07 57 .. 
 
Note: 
a
 Manufacturing firms only 
Source: World Bank (2003, 2008). 
 
The overall impression from these data is, as before, that innovation is a quite frequent 
phenomenon in developing countries.10 Similarly to the CIS surveys, innovations in the PICS 
survey are new to the firm, not necessarily new to the market or to the world as a whole. 
However, since firms in developing countries can benefit from imitation of technologies already 
in use in the developed part of the world, they may – everything else equal - be more likely to 
introduce the “new to the firm” innovations than their counterparts in Europe or elsewhere.  
                                                 
10
 An intriguing finding is that, with an exception for China, the propensity to answer positively is much higher in 
the PICS than in the CIS surveys. We are not aware of any attempt to explain this result, which occurss in spite of 
the fact that the definitions are not all that different. The major difference between the two surveys is that in the CIS 
the questionnaire is more elaborate and the term “innovation” is used.  
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Probably much of this is related to diffusion of advanced technology from abroad - “innovation 
through imitation” as Kim (1997) puts it - rather than major “new to the world” technological 
breakthroughs.  But as pointed out above this does not at all make these innovations less relevant 
economically.  
 
Econometric studies based on CIS and PICS data 
 
Stylized facts on the propensity of firms to innovate are informative but do not reveal much 
about factors that explain innovation in firms and about its effect on performance. To delve 
deeper into such issues researchers have attempted to use econometric models, and we discuss 
aspects of this work in the following. Tables 5 and 6 provide an overview of the studies taken 
into account here.11  
A natural starting point is to look for variables explaining innovation, which is the 
question addressed by the first set of papers considered here (Table 5). The column to the far 
right lists the key explanatory variables taken into account. In spite of the fact that the models, 
samples and methods differ, the results seem to be quite robust. First of all, as in developed 
countries, large firms are more innovative than smaller ones but the latter tend to report relatively 
higher proportion of sales of innovative products. The age of the firm, on the other hand, is not a 
conducive factor for innovation. Firms with more well-developed technological capabilities, 
broadly defined (e.g., not only internal R&D but also capabilities in design, engineering, quality 
standards, adoption of ICT, marketing, management and skills) are clearly more innovative. The 
same goes for firms that use external sources of knowledge intensively and interact actively with 
                                                 
11
 It should be pointed out that the list is unlikely to be exhaustive, because there is a lot of work in progress along 
these lines. Moreover, studies based on other sources of data than innovation, such as for example the traditional 
R&D surveys (or various surveys occasionally organized by research project), are not included.  
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customers, suppliers and other parts of the innovation system. These positive results do not carry 
over to measures of foreign ownership, which did not come out as significantly correlated with 
innovation in almost half of the cases considered, and this also holds for the relationship between 
exports and innovation.12 Surprisingly, given the pivotal role of diffusion in technological 
catching up, the effect of (openness to) imports has been rarely been been taken into account in 
the existing research. But to the extent that it has been included in the investigation import 
openness has come out positive and significant (in sharp contrast to the mixed results of foreign 
ownership and exports).  
 
                                                 
12
 Another set of studies, not listed in the table because they focused on exports as the dependent variable, 
considered the possibility of a reverse causality (from innovation to exports). Özçelik and Taymaz (2004), de Araújo 
(2007), Chudnovsky, et al. (2007) and Correa, et al (2007) found positive and statistically significant correlations 
between innovation and exports in Argentina, Brazil, Turkey, but not in Ecuador. 
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Table 5: Estimates of the propensity of firms to innovate based on micro data from CIS/PICS in developing 
countries 
Key results 
Author(s) Survey Country(s) Sample 
size Method 
Dependent 
variable 
S
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E
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E
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&
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n
 
C
o
u
n
t
r
y
 
Pamukçu (2003) CIS Turkey  1,108a 2probit INNOV +    + 0  0 0 +  0 Y   
Lee (2004) CIS Malaysia 501a Logit INNOV + 
− 
     0 
− 
   Y   
Oerlemans and Pretorius (2006) CIS South Africa 189b OLS INNSALE 
− 
 0 + + + 0 0 0    Y   
Crespi and Peirano (2007) CIS Chile 1,048a Hprobit INNMKT +  +    +    +  Y   
Goedhuys (2007a) PICS Tanzania 257 Probit INNPDT 0 0 + + + + + 0     Y   
Gonçalves, et al (2007) CIS Argentina 1,256a Probit INNMKT +  + +  +  
− 
+ + +  Y   
     INNPCS +  + +  +  0 0 + +  Y   
  Brazil 6,626a  INNMKT +  + +  +  + 0 + +  Y   
     INNPCS +  + +  +  + + + 0  Y   
Hegde and Shapira (2007) CIS Malaysia 1,819 Logit INNPDT + 
− 
+ + +  + 0 0    Y   
     INNPCS + 0 + + +  + 0 0    Y   
     INNORG + 0 + + +  + 0 0    Y   
Sung and Carlsson (2007) CIS Korea 1,124ab Logit INNPDT 0 0 +    + 0 0   0 Y   
     INNPCS + 0 0    + + 0   + Y   
Srholec (2007a) CIS Czech Rep.  3,801 Mlogit INNOV + 
− 
     +     Y Y  
Almeida and Fernandez (2008) PICS 43 countries 15,522a Probit INNPCS + 
− 
+  + +  ± + +   Y  Y 
Falk (2008) CIS 6 new EU 10,018 Probit  INNMKT + 0      + +    Y  Y 
     INNPDT + 0      + +    Y  Y 
     INNPCS + 0      + +    Y  Y 
    Flogit b INNSALE 
− − 
+ +  + + + +    Y  Y 
Jaklic, et al. (2008) CIS Slovenia 1,972b Probit INNOV +  +  0  + 0 0  0  Y   
Karray and Kriaa (2008) CIS Tunisia 300 a Probit INNPDT 0  +  +   
− 
    Y   
Srholec (2008) PICS 28 countries 15,818 Mlogit INNPDT + 
− 
+ + +        Y  Y 
Srholec (2009) CIS 7 new EU  28,846 Probit INNOV + 
− 
     + +    Y  Y 
47 
 
 
Table 6: Estimates of the link between innovation and productivity based on micro data from CIS/PICS in 
developing countries 
Key results 
Author(s) Survey Country(s) Sample 
size Method 
Depen-
dent 
variable 
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Benavente (2006) CIS Chile 438a CDM Y/Le +  + 0       +   Y   
Chudnovsky, et al. (2006) CIS Argentina 1,410a CDM Y/Ld 
− 
   + 0 +    + 0 0 Y   
Jefferson, et al. (2006) CIS China 5,451a CDM Y/Le   + +        +  Y   
     PROFIT   + +        +  Y   
Goedhuys (2007b) PICS Brazil 1,061a 2LS yd 
− 
+    0 0  + + + + + Y Y  
Goedhuys, et al (2008a) PICS Tanzania 187a OLS Y/Le 0  +   0 0  0 + + +  Y   
Goedhuys, et al (2008b) PICS 5 countries 389c OLS Y/Le 0  +   0 0  0  + +  Y  Y 
   365c  Y/Le 0  +   0 0  +  0 0  Y  Y 
   956c  Y/Le 0  +   0 0  +  + 0  Y  Y 
Lee and Kang (2007) CIS Korea 2,539a WLS y/ld + 
− 
   0 +  + 0   + Y   
de Negri, et al. (2007) CIS Brazil 1,860a CDM K/L +    +      + + + Y Y  
 
    K 
− − 
   + +       Y Y  
Roud (2007) CIS Russia 497a CDM Y/Ld 
− 
 + +   0    +  0 Y   
Masso and Vahter (2008) CIS Estonia  1,142a CDM Y/Lde 
− 
 +   + + +     + Y   
 
    y/lde 
− 
 +   0 0 +     0 Y   
Raffo, et al (2008) CIS Argentina  1,308a CDM Y/Ld 0  +   0 0 0   + +  Y   
  Brazil 9,452a  Y/Ld +  +   + + +   + +  Y   
  Mexico 1,515a  Y/Ld +     + + 0   0 +  Y   
Damijan, et al (2008b) CIS Slovenia 4,947 CDM Y/Le 
− 
 +  +       + 0 Y   
   4,171  y/le   +  + + +     + + Y   
Goedhuys and Srholec (2009) PICS 42 countries 19,147 Mlinear Y/Le +  +      + + + +  Y  Y 
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Abbreviations: 
Variables:  Methods:  
Y/L, K/L = Output (Y) or capital (K) per employee (L); small caps denote growth 2LS = Two-stage Least Square 
PROFIT = Profitability given by profit to sales 2probit = Two-stage probit 
INNOV = Dummy for product or process innovation CDM = Crépon-Duguet-Mairesse model 
INNMKT = Dummy for product innovation new to the market Hprobit = Heckman probit 
INNPDT = Dummy for product innovation Flogit = Fractional logit 
INNPCS = Dummy for process innovation Mlinear = Multilevel linear 
INNORG = Dummy for organizational innovation Mlogit = Multilevel logit 
INNSALE = Sale of innovated products as % of turnover OLS = Ordinary Least Square 
SIZE = Size of the firm WLS = Weighted Least Square 
AGE = Age of the firm   
R&D = Internal R&D represented by a dummy or as % of turnover   
BROAD = Broader non-R&D capabilities, such as design, engineering, ISO norms, ICT, marketing, knowledge management etc. 
EDU = Education, skills or training of the labour force   
BUY = Acquisition/purchase of external embodied (machinery) or disembodied (external R&D, licensing, etc.) technology 
LINK = Linkages (cooperation, sourcing information, etc.) with other organizations   
FOR = Dummy for foreign ownership   
EXP = Export given by a dummy (EXPBIN) or as % of turnover (EXPINT)   
IMP = Import given by a dummy or as % of turnover/inputs    
Sector = Sectoral differences   
Region = Regional differences   
Country = National differences   
 
Symbols: Notes: 
+ = Significantly positive at least at 10% level a Manufacturing (industrial) firms only 
− 
= Significantly negative at least at 10% level b Innovative firms only 
0 = Not significantly different from zero at 10% level c 389 in food, 365 in textiles and 956 in garments and leather industries 
Y d Sales denote the output 
 
= Yes 
e
 Value added denotes the output 
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 Another important question considered in the literature is the impact of innovation on 
firm performance (Table 6). A widely used econometric approach for assessing this effect is the 
so-called Crépon-Duguet-Mairesse (CDM) structural model (Crépon et al. 1998), which in a 
sequential way considers links between R&D, innovation and labour productivity. Using CIS 
type data this framework has been applied to at least eight developing countries. Statistically 
significant effects of at least one of the innovation variables have been confirmed in most cases. 
Using a different approach, Lee and Kang (2007) found a positive effect of process innovation, 
but no effect of product innovation, on productivity. In contrast, Goedhuys and associates, in 
series of papers based on the PICS data, failed to confirm any significant effect of innovation on 
productivity (Goedhuys, 2007ab and Goedhuys, et al 2008ab).  
 Finally, we examine how differences in contexts to which firms belong have been taken 
into account by the available literature. Information on this is included in Tables 5 and 6 in the 
last three sub- columns under “Key results”. As is evident from the tables all of the studies 
controlled in one way or another for sectoral differences but only some considered territorial 
differences. Gonçalves et al (2007), and Raffo et al. (2008) estimated the same model on data for 
a number of different countries, which allowed them to throw light on the underlying structural 
and institutional differences. Goedhuys et al (2008b), Almeida and Fernandes (2008), Falk 
(2008) and Srholec (2009) pooled micro data from different countries, using dummies for 
possible country effects, many of which were significant. In a related exercise Goedhuys (2007b) 
and de Negri et al. (2007) found regional dummies to be significant predictors.  
Hence, there appear to be important differences across countries, regions and sectors, but 
the approach commonly used (based on dummy variables) is unable to explore the reasons for 
those differences.  To do that, a more useful approach might be to specify separate variables for 
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the underlying “framework conditions” that contribute to these contextual effects . Another 
reason for concern may be that standard regression techniques usually assume that observations 
are independent from each other. However, if observations belonging to the same group, such as 
a sector, region or country, are influenced by context-specific factors, this assumption is likely to 
be violated. In such cases so-called multilevel modelling (Goldstein, 2003) - also known as 
hierarchical, random coefficient or variance component models – which relaxes the 
independence assumption may be a more efficient tool for the analysis.  
Srholec (2007a), using multilevel modelling on CIS data from the Czech Republic, found  
that various regional factors, including the quality of the regional innovation system,  influenced 
the propensity of firms to innovate, but that the strength of these effects depended various firm 
level characteristics. Using a multilevel model on PICS data from 28 countries, mostly 
developing, Srholec (2008) demonstrated that in addition to firm level characteristics, including a 
rich set of capability indicators, a number of variables representing the national framework 
conditions also contributed to the explanation the likelihood of firms to innovate. Similarly, 
Goedhuys and Srholec (2009), in a follow-up study based on evidence from PICS in 42 
countries, showed that various national factors influenced firms’ abilities to benefit from their 
own technological capabilities. For example, firms located in countries with a higher R&D 
intensity benefitted considerably more from their own R&D spending than otherwise similar 
firms in low R&D environments. Hence, national and firm level capabilities interact in the 
process of development.  
A shortcoming of the literature surveyed in this section is that panel data in most cases do 
not exist. This makes it difficult to consider the issue of the direction of causality in a satisfactory 
manner. In principle, instrumental methods may help dealing with this problem but good 
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instruments are hard to find. Griffith et al. (2006), in the context of CDM modelling, admit that 
despite the best efforts, one by and large still deals with correlation rather than causation, and 
this probably goes for many of the studies considered here.  
 
5. International sources of innovation for development 
  
While the building of national capabilities may be the aspect of catching-up that is most directly 
influenced by domestic policy, the process also depends on foreign sources of knowledge and 
technology. Knowledge from abroad may flow through a variety of channels, such as migration, 
licensing, trade and foreign direct investment (FDI).13 Some of these flows are not mitigated 
through markets, such as in the case of scientific and technical cooperation with foreign 
governments (as part of development aid). However, knowledge may also flow in as a direct 
result of market transactions, such as the licensing of a patent. Other market-related forms 
include knowledge flows associated with trade and investment, or labour migration (although the 
latter is usually from developing nations to the developed world). Arora, Fosfuri and 
Gambardella (2004) argue that there is now also an explicit market for knowledge itself, for 
example in the form of engineering services, but this is mostly relevant for developed countries.  
The “capabilities” literature that was summarized above has mostly focused on the catch-
up experience of individual countries (e.g., Lall and Urata, 2003). From these individual country 
histories, it appears that there is no single answer to the question of which channels are most 
important for sourcing knowledge from abroad. In Asia, Japan is the earliest example of a 
successful catching-up country. Industrialization in Japan started in the latter half of the 19th 
                                                 
13
 For overviews see Cincera and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie 2001; Keller 2004. 
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century, but a significant break in the process occurred with World War II. Goto and Odagiri 
(2003) describe how, in the post-war phase, the Japanese sourced technology mainly by 
importing capital goods, licensing of technology (and other forms of alliances) from Western 
firms, reverse engineering, and the use of trade-missions and other forms of intelligence targeted 
at learning about foreign technology. In summary, “Japan acquired advanced foreign technology 
through all channels except for inward FDI” (Goto and Odagiri (2003, p. 89).  
The absence of FDI as a channel for knowledge transfer is also typical for some other 
Asian catching-up countries that followed suit after Japan, such as Korea (Kim, 1997, 2003) and 
Taiwan (Aw, 2003). Like Japan, these countries tended to rely on “arms-length” relations with 
foreign firms, combined with the building up of capabilities of domestic firms, facilitated by 
domestic policies for learning (e.g., education, industrial policy and trade policy). A direct role 
of foreign firms in the domestic economy was explicitly discouraged by policy, at least in the 
initial phase of catching-up (this changed in the late 1970s and 1980s, especially in Korea). 
However, in some other Asian countries, most notably Singapore, FDI was an important channel 
of knowledge transfer from the beginning of the catching-up process (Wong, 2003).  
The relatively low importance attached to FDI as a mean of during catching-up in the 
above cases may partly be related to the existence of strong domestic firms. Amsden (1989) has 
argued that in Korea, the existence of large domestic conglomerate firms was a decisive factor in 
generating growth. As in Japan and Taiwan, these firms, helped by an active government policy, 
were able to build up their own technological capabilities by means of assimilating foreign 
knowledge. This process took the form of gradual learning, resulting eventually in the ability to 
undertake product innovation by means of R&D. However, an important intermediate step in this 
process of building up capabilities was so-called Original Equipment Manufacturing (OEM), in 
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which Asian firms would manufacture products for foreign (Japanese as well as Western) firms, 
according to exact specifications supplied by the foreign firms (Hobday, 2000).   
Thus, multinational enterprises play an important role in the transfer of knowledge across 
borders and not only through FDI. They are responsible for a large part of R&D performed in the 
private sector in the developed part of the world14 and for them knowledge is a key asset and 
source of competitive advantage. Such knowledge-assets can be exploited in foreign markets 
through three main mechanisms (Blomström and Kokko, 1998): the licensing of technology to 
foreign actors, investment in the foreign country, or exports.  
Data on licensing and other forms of “arms-length” knowledge trade, arguably a decisive 
channel of knowledge transfer, has until recently not been very widely available. Hence, there is 
little (econometric) work on the impact of technology payments in developing countries, despite 
the fact that this seems to be an important channel for knowledge transfer, especially in the early 
phases of catching-up.  Technology inflows measured in this way were typically in the order of 
magnitude of about 0 – ½ % of GDP in the early 21st century, with the highest values recorded in 
the developed part of the world (including South-East Asia). As such, they are an order of 
magnitude lower than FDI flows, which may range up to 5% of GDP.  
FDI is what clearly has received most scholarly attention, although as mentioned above 
this does not seem to be warranted by the literature.15 Knowledge transfer associated with FDI 
can take the form of joint ventures between domestic and multinational firms, other forms of 
                                                 
14
 According to the "Innovation R&D Scoreboard" prepared by the Department of Trade and Industry in the UK, in 
2007, Microsoft was the largest corporate R&D spender in the world, with a total R&D budget of about 8.2 billion 
US$. According to the IMF database, this is comparable to the total GDP of Mozambique (8.1 billion US$). The 
median value of GDP in the IMF database is 20.7 billion US$, i.e., about 2½ times the Microsoft R&D budget. 
According to the R&D Scoreboard, there are 29 (69) companies that spent more than 2 (1) billion US$ on R&D in 
2007. 
15
 The literature on FDI, MNEs and spillovers of their knowledge-related activities addresses both developed and 
developing countries. An early survey is Blomström and Kokko (1998), a more recent one is Görg and Greenaway 
(2004). 
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cooperation such as strategic alliances, linkage effects (i.e., contacts with local suppliers or 
customers), labour mobility, informal contacts between the MNE and local firms, and 
demonstration effects (i.e., an MNE showing that a technology works reduces uncertainty for 
local firms). The literature also identifies increased competition as a source of spillovers of FDI 
to the host economy, i.e., the effect on domestic firms that are forced to increase efficiency in 
order to compete with the foreign firms.  
The impact of FDI is partly related to the strategy of foreign firms with regard to their 
presence in developing nations. For instance, although most foreign affiliates may be mere 
passive adopters of foreign technology, some may be actively involved in knowledge creating 
activities in developing countries and this may increase the possibility for spillovers. Using data 
from innovation survey in Argentina, Bell and Marin (2004) and Marin and Bell (2006) 
examined the role of knowledge-generating activities of foreign affiliates for knowledge 
spillovers. They found that while spillovers are likely to be generated by foreign affiliates that 
are technologically active in the host country, there was no significant effect in that regard for 
those that were not.  
Because most of the channels through which FDI generates spillovers are hard to observe 
directly, unless a case study approach is used,16 most of the empirical literature relies on 
estimating productivity equations, usually based on a production function approach, for domestic 
firms or sectors, in which MNE presence is one of the independent variables. The early literature 
of this type (e.g., Blomström and Persson, 1983, in a study on Mexico) relied on including the 
share of foreign ownership in regressions explaining sectoral productivity differences, or as an 
                                                 
16
 The electronics industry in Asia is such a case. A series of case studies (e.h., Hobday and Rush, 2007, Kim, 1997, 
Ernst and Kim 2002) has shown how Asian electronics firms used knowledge from foreign firms to go through a 
series of stages: from mere assembly to process engineering and, eventually, product development through R&D and 
FDI played an important role in this process of technological upgrading.  
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industry-level variable in a microeconomic dataset. This approach cannot distinguish between 
the different spillover channels, but it does allow, by the inclusion of firm-level variables related 
to absorptive capacity, for a heterogeneous impact of spillovers  among (local) receiving firms. 
Blomström and Kokko (1998) conclude that the evidence from these early studies is mixed, and 
suggests that whether or not spillovers from MNEs to local firms take place depends on many 
aspects of the local and sectoral context. Due to a lack of detailed data, many studies are not able 
to measure these factors, and, moreover, analyses covering more than a single country were (and 
still are) rare.  
The more recent econometric literature on FDI spillovers has used more refined 
indicators and methods. With regard to indicators one trend has been to distinguish between 
horizontal (intra-industry) and vertical (inter-industry) spillovers. Wooster and Diebel (2006) 
provide an overview of 32 econometric studies of the impact of FDI in developing countries 
(among which they include transition countries in Eastern Europe), covering a publication time 
span of 1983 – 2004.17 They find positive effects of spillovers in about half of the included 
observations (an observation is a regression result, of which there are generally more than one 
per paper analyzed), and slightly less than half of the reported coefficients are statistically 
significant. Among the most salient findings of this exercise are that using an employment-based 
measure of foreign presence as the independent variable increases the likelihood of finding 
positive spillovers; that analyses on firm-level data find significant spillovers less often; that in 
more recent periods it is more likely to find positive spillovers; that spillovers are more likely to 
be positive in Asia; and that it is important to include R&D and time period fixed effects as 
control variables. 
                                                 
17
 They do not include studies dealing with vertical spillovers, such as Smarzynska Javorcik, 2004, and Damijan and 
Knell, 2005. 
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On the methodological front the use of panel data is an important in aspect in recent 
econometric studies on the subject. But according to Wooster and Diebel, the use of panel data 
does not change the results significantly. In contrast, Görg and Strobl (2001), in a similar meta-
study for a sample of both developed and developing nations, report that using panel data usually 
yields negative or insignificant spillovers. One needs to keep in mind, however, that the panels 
used in this literature are usually short, while FDI spillovers are essentially long-run in nature, 
and that the impact of FDI spillovers may be conditional on unobserved factors, such as for 
example absorptive capacity, that feed into the (usually undocumented and time-invariant) fixed 
effects in panel regressions. 
Trade is a different way in which developing countries can benefit from knowledge flows 
(see the chapter by Keller in this volume for a more extensive overview). Spillovers from trade 
may come in the form of what Griliches (1979) called rent spillovers. This refers to the idea that 
because of competition, quality improvements of traded goods are not fully reflected in price 
increases. Trade can also expose firms to new product specifications, and this can lead to 
imitation. The work on knowledge flows related to trade has mostly focused on sectoral or 
macro-data, mainly because trade data are usually not available at the firm level. The study by 
Coe, Helpman and Hoffmaister (1997) arrived at an optimistic conclusion with regard to the 
impact of trade-embodied knowledge flows in developing countries. Their methodology involves 
the estimation of a production function in which "imported R&D” is one of the independent 
variables. “Imported R&D” is R&D performed in the exporting country, but embodied in the 
exports, through which it may have an impact on growth in the importing country.18 They 
estimated that, in 1990, R&D spillovers from developed to developing nations were worth about 
                                                 
18
 The Coe, Helpman and Hoffmaister methodology has come under critique, on the account that the trade-related 
weighting scheme may be spurious. This is discussed at length in the chapter by Keller in this volume. 
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22 billion US$, which would be comparable to about half of the total global development aid 
during that period. Jacob and Meister (2004) applied a similar model to the case of Indonesia, 
also incorporating linkages at the sectoral level, as well as market structure. They also concluded 
that trade embodied knowledge flow are important for productivity growth in that country.  
In summary, the available work on foreign knowledge inflows into developing nations 
point out that the sources of these knowledge flows are many and heterogeneous in nature. 
MNEs play an important part in these flows, by their nature as "fluent" entities in the global 
economy. However, whether or not FDI and other international knowledge sources contribute to 
the performance of local firms in developing countries, depends on local circumstances and 
capabilities of the firms on the "receiving end" (Criscuolo and Narula, 2008). It has also been 
suggested that the contribution of the various channels of international knowledge transfer may 
change over time. Arguably, changes in governance of the global economy may have closed off 
catching-up paths that were followed by countries such as Japan and Korea, for example because 
trade policies that formed an essential part of the catching-up process in these countries are no 
longer allowed under current WTO rules (Chang, 2003), or because tighter rules about 
intellectual property rights make the use of some knowledge transfer channels that previously 
were important for catching-up more difficult or costly (Kim, 2003). 
6. Conclusions 
 
This paper has focused on the literature on innovation and development. Until recently most 
people would have considered it odd to consider innovation as an important issue for developing 
countries, and many probably still see it that way. This skepticism is based on the widely shared 
view that innovation primarily is of interest for high-tech firms in advanced environments. 
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According to this perspective new technologies emerge in advanced economies and gradually 
diffuse to the developing part of the world. Since technology in this perspective has strong public 
good properties such diffusion may be expected to yield relatively quick benefits in the 
developing part of the world. To avoid this outcome, it is argued, legal instruments that prevent 
such easy, costless diffusion are needed. Followers of this perspective therefore place great 
emphasis on intellectual property rights as in incentive to secure steady technological progress in 
the advanced corners of the globe and hence in the global economy as a whole. However, it is 
also acknowledged that such protection can never be perfect and will be temporary in any case. 
Thus, diffusion of new technology, created through innovation in the advanced part of the world, 
should according to this perspective be expected to work as powerful equalizer in the global 
economy, making it possible for poor countries to quickly raise their standards of living. 
Although the logic of this “public good” approach to the role of technology and 
innovation seemed convincing at first, it gradually became evident that it could not be the whole 
story. Two pieces of evidence in particular came to undermine the approach. First it became 
evident that the convergence in technology and productivity that the approach predicted did not 
materialize. In a long run perspective differences were at the increase, not the other way around. 
How could this happen? Second, the most famous examples of countries that managed to escape 
the low development trap and raise their standards of living towards developed country levels 
relatively quickly were far from being passive adopters of new, developed countries 
technologies. On the contrary countries such as Korea (South), Taiwan and Singapore, which 
were among the prime success stories, placed great emphasis on generating what later became 
known as “technological capabilities” through a concerted effort by public and private sector 
actors and apparently it paid off handsomely. Why were such activist development strategies that 
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contradicted much common wisdom, seemingly much more successful than the “hands off” 
approach advocated by leading authorities and institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank, 
what is often called the “Washington consensus”? 
These were some of the questions that gradually became more central to the agendas of 
politicians, development experts and economists through the closing decades of the millennium 
and the beginning of the next and it led as we have shown to the emergence of new theories, 
approaches and evidence. Arguably, the process started already back in the 1950s when 
economic historians started to analyse actual catching up processes and came up with 
generalizations that were far from the liberal “hands off” approach in favor among economists. 
As a consequence a stream of research emerged, mainly among economic historians and 
economists with a more heterodox leaning, that focused on “capability building” of various sorts 
as essential for development processes. This way of looking at things gained moment during the 
1980s and 1990s as the success of the Asian tigers (and Japan before that) became more widely 
recognized and studied. The term “technological capability”, originally developed as a tool for 
analysing the Korean case, gradually became more widely used among students of development 
processes, and a large amount of research emerged using this approach to understand the 
performance of firms, industries and countries in the developing part of the world. 
It is fair to say, however, that in spite of these developments, many economists continue 
to be unconvinced by the “capability” approach, may be because it is seen as meso- or macro 
approach lacking proper micro foundations, theoretically as well empirically.  However, it is 
particularly at this point that the research is most strongly increasing today, in the form a massive 
data gathering effort on innovation activities in developing countries, and analyses based on 
these new sources of information. These new developments, which follow similar efforts in the 
60 
 
 
developed part of the world (particularly Europe) from the 1990s onwards, has vividly 
demonstrated that the “high tech” approach to innovation which has framed much thinking and 
policy advice on the subject is strongly misleading when it comes to understanding the 
relationship between innovation and development. In fact, the evidence shows that innovation is 
quite widespread among developing country firms, is associated with higher productivity (e.g., 
development) and, as in the developed part of the world, is dependent on web of interactions 
with other private and public actors. This is not to say that innovation in developed and 
developing countries are identical in every respect but in qualitative terms innovation is found to 
be a powerful force of growth in both and therefore an issue that it is imperative to get a better 
understanding of, theoretically as well as empirically. 
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